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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
e. Conclusions of law: In Golden v. Joseph,0 city employees
under the civil service designation of "stationary firemen"
brought an action under § 220 of the Labor Law demanding fixa-
tion of their wages at the prevailing rate under that section. The
New York City Comptroller dismissed the petitions on the ground
that petitioners' employment was not such as to bring them within
the statutory definition of laborers, workmen or mechanics em-
ployed in the construction, maintenance or repair of public works."
The Appellate Division affirmed.
2
The Court of Appeals, per Judge Desmond, unanimously re-
versed this determination on the ground that it was error to ex-
clude evidence that these employees actually did make repairs on
buildings though their classification did not specifically call for
it, and hence, since they did in fact make such repairs, they did
have a right to a wage fixation under §220. It is true that the test
of whether or not a city employee is engaged in construction, main-
tenance or repair of public works is the municipal civil service
description of his job duties,"3 but the designation of "stationary
firemen" encompassed such work as was embraced by the statute.




a. Right of appraisal: Section 21 of the Stock Corporation
Law provides procedures for the determination of the value of the
stock of a stockholder objecting properly to various kinds of action
by the corporation.' The corporation may make an offer to pur-
chase the objector's stock. If it does not do so, or the stockholder
fails to accept the offer, the stockholder of the corporation may
petition the Supreme Court to determine the value. "Such petition
shall be made returnable on the fiftieth day after the last day on
which the demand of the objecting stockholder for payment might
have been made . . ." Certain recapitalizations2 are subject to
80. 307 N. Y. 62, 120 N. E. 2d 162 (1954).
81. LABOR LAW §220(2).
82. Golden v. Joseph, 281 App. Div. 655, 117 N.Y. S. 2d 653 (1st Dep't 1952).
83. Flannery v. Joseph, 300 N.Y. 149, 89 N.E. 2d 869 (1949).
1. A right of appraisal arises under Stock Corporation Law § 14 (issue of stock
to employees in derogation of preemptive rights) ; § 20 (sale of assets) ; § 85 (merger) ;
§ 91 (consolidation) ; Art. 4, especially § 38(11) (amendment of certificate of incor-
poration) ; § 105 (dissolution).
2. STOCK CoRIoRATioN LAW § 38(11).
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the right of appraisal under Section 21, providing that those not
in favor of such action object and demand payment "prior to the
vote authorizing such action."
In re McKinney,3 dealt with a petition for appraisal by stock-
holders objecting to a proposed plan of recapitalization. The
plan included the provision that it was to go into effect only if and
when the directors declared the plan operative.
Before the plan was approved by the stockholders on Nov. 26,
1951, the McKinneys filed their petition and demanded payment.
On April 7, 1952, the directors declared the plan to be operative.
On May 1, 1952, the McKinneys filed their petition for appraisal,
more than fifty days after the stockholders vote, but fewer than
fifty days after the directors' decision.
The court, in a four to three decision, affirmed the order dis-
missing the petition holding: the vote referred to in Sections 21
and 38 of the Stock Corporation Law is the vote of the stock-
holders, and the 50 days commences to run from that day even
though the dissenters could not know until the declaration by the
directors that the plan, to which they objected, would be put into
effect. The court felt itself bound by a strict reading of the
statutes and suggested that better protection for dissenting stock-
holders would have to be given by the Legislature. -
In a strong and cogent dissent, Fuld argues that since in
charter amendments such as this, the statute clearly requires
a stockholder vote "authorizing" the change, and does not pro-
vide for delegation to the directors of the power to make the
change operative, the Legislature intended to exclude the directors
from such a discretionary determination. Since the Legislature
intended the fifty days to run from the stockholders' vote where
that vote was to be conclusive, where as here the conclusive vote
was the declaration by the directors, and not by the stockholders,
the fifty days should run from the date of the directors' declara-
tion.
Rights of appraisal under Section 21 also apply where a
stockholder objects to a voluntary sale of corporate property4 or
to the exchange of the corporation assets for stock of another cor-
poration under a voluntary dissolution.5
3. 306 N.Y. 207, 117 N.E. 2d 256 (1954).
4. STOCK CoRPoRATIoN LAW § 20.
5. Id. § 105(9).
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If the sale or exchange is within the statutory framework,
the objecting stockholder is limited to his right of appraisal and
may not enjoin the transaction.0
In Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corporation.,7 the
court, on finding that the proposed plan was not within the statute,
decided that an objecting stockholder was not limited to his right
of appraisal and did enjoin the transaction.
Here the corporation proposed to transfer all of its assets
(real property in New York City) to a Delaware corporation to
be formed, in exchange for all of the stock of the Delaware cor-
poration. This stock was to be deposited in a voting trust pur-
suant to a voting trust agreement giving the trustees power to
elect directors of the Delaware corporation and to sell all of the
stock of the Delaware corporation. The stockholders of the New
York corporation were to exchange their stock for certificates
of the voting trust; then the New York corporation was to be
dissolved.
Further complications are involved, but on these facts, the
court needed no authority, other than the statutes, to decide for
the plaintiff-objecting stockholder, and block the plan. Judge
Fuld's concurring opinion amply disposes of the problem; "The
series of transactions contemplated . . . involve far more than
a sale or conveyance within the statute."
b. Security in derivative actions: Section 61b of the General
Corporation Law provides that, "In any action instituted or
maintained in the right . . . of a corporation . . . by the holder
of less than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class
of the corporation's stock unless the shares . . . have a market
value in excess of $50,000.00, the corporation, in whose right
such action is brought shall be entitled . . . to . . . require the
plaintiffs . . . to give security . . ."
In Gordon v. Elliman,' a holder of less than five percent of
the stock worth less than $50,000.00 brought suit against the cor-
poration and its directors to compel a dividend payment. No
dividends were guaranteed on the stock. -
Defendant moved under Section 61b of the General Corpora-
tion Law to require plaintiff to post security.
6. Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., 300 N. Y. 11, 87 N. E. 2d 561 (1949)
and 'other cases cited in Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 203 Misc. 59, 116
N. Y. S. 2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
7. 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E. 2d 652 (1953).
8. 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E. 2d 331 (1954).
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Van Voorhis, speaking for a majority of the Court, held for
the defendant, deciding that a suit against a corporation and its
directors to compel declaration of dividends is an action in the
right of the corporation.
The only prior New York decision directly in point is Swinton
v. Bush,9 which held just the opposite-that a suit to compel dec-
laration of dividends is not in the right of the corporation and
not within 61b. Authorities and decisions in other jurisdictions
and prior dictum in New York are in hopeless conflict on this
point.10
The court distinguished cases where the stockholder could sue
at law to recover dividends already declared,1 or dividends guar-
anteed,12 and laid down the general proposition that an action
"is in the right of the corporation which involves the equitable
powers of the Supreme Court to direct the management of its
affairs." "A stockholder has no individual cause of action to
recover dividends that have not been declared." All that he
can do, is to sue in equity to cause the court to perform a cor-
porate function which the directors would have done except for
bad faith.
Rejecting the argument that the interests of the stockholder
were opposed to those of the corporation where dividend pay-
ments are concerned, Van Voorhis observed that the failure of
the directors properly to declare dividends may be a wrong to the
corporation because of the difficulties of getting fresh capital and
the penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.'3
Fuld, in his dissent, argues that though it may be in the
interest of the corporation to declare dividends, the General Cor-
poration Law concerns the right of the corporation, and contends
that the right to have dividends declared is one of the incidents
9. 119 Misc. 321, 102 N.Y. S. 2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd 278 App. Div. 754,
103 N. Y. S. 2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1951).
10. Compare Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Grove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E. 2d
482 (1939); Jones z,. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp.
204 (3d Dep't 1930) ; FLETCHER, CoRoRATIoNS (Rev. ed. 1932) § 5326, uith BALANTINE,
COPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 234, Kranich v. Bach, 209 App. Div. 52, 204 N. Y. Supp.
320 (1924) ; Stevens v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 68 N. J. Eq. 373, 59 A. 905 (1905).
11. Godly v. Crandall & Godly Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 127, 105 N.E. 818, 820 (1914).
12. Boardman v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 84 N.Y. 157 (1881).
13. INT. REV. CoDE, § 102. "There shall be levied . . . (in addition to other
taxes . . . ) upon the net income of every corporation . . . if such corporation . . .
is availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its share-
holders, through the medium of permitting earnings of profits to accumulate instead of
being divided or distributed, a surtax equal to the sum of the following: 2752% of the
amount of the undistributed section 102 net income not in excess of $100,000, plus
38.,% of the undistributed section 102 net income in excess of $100,000."
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of stock ownership belonging to the individual stockholder, not
to the corporation.
c. Right to reimbursement: Section 64 of the General Corpo-
ration Law provides that "any person made a party to an action by
reason of the fact that he is a director, officer or employee of a
corporation shall be entitled to have his reasonable expenses .. .
incurred in connection with the defense of such action . . . as-
sessed against the corporation . . .except in the relation to mat-
ters as to which it shall be adjudged in such action . . .that such
officer, director or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct
in the performance of his duties." [Emphasis added.]
In the recent case of Diamond v. Diamond,14 an individual
defendant who had won a verdict in a derivative suit, moved to
receive from the corporation the reasonable expenses incurred
pursuant to Section 64.
The verdict in the derivative suit had gone to the defendant.'5
The trial court had found that the individual stockholder bring-
ing the suit was a party to the alleged wrongs of the defendant
and as she could not recover individually, she could not re-
dress those wrongs in a derivative suit.16 Upon motion by the
defendant under Section 65, the trial court awarded expenses
under Section 67, finding in the words of that section that the
applicant was "successful in whole or in part." 7 Judge Di Falco
of Special Term, after a review of the history of Article VI-A,
concluded that "adjudged liable" in Section 64 taken in conjunc-
tion with "successful in whole or in part" of Section 67 means a
judgment entered on a decision.
A majority of the court, in an opinion by Judge Desmond,
narrowed the scope of Section 64 by broadening the concept of
"adjudged liable."' 8  It held that the intent of the Legislature
was not to award eipenses to faithless officers and directors, and
therefore, "adjudged liable" should be construed to mean a find-
ing by a court, and not only a judgment.
d. Voluntary dissolution: Article 9 of the General Corpora-
tion Law deals with proceedings for voluntary dissolution of a
domestic corporation.
14. 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E. 2d 819 (1954).
15. Diamond v. Diamond, 200 Misc. 1055, 107 N.Y. S. 2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
16. See Capital Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E. 2d 704
(1951).
17. Diamond v. Diamond, 200 Misc. 1074, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
18. The scope of Art. 6-A was previously restricted by excluding defenses of
criminal actions. Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.
2d 533 (1953). See 3 BFIo. L. REv. 62 (1953).
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Section 103 provides that if there is a deadlock between
directors, or between stockholders as to the election of directors,
the holders of one-half of the stock may petition for dissolution.
Under Section 106, the court may entertain or dismiss the applica-
tion. When it entertains the application, the "court must make
an order requiring all persons interested to show cause before it,
or a referee, why the corporation should not be dissolved."
Section 113 declares that the court or referee must hear allega-
tions and proofs and determine the facts. Finally, under Section
117, if "it shall appear . . . that a dissolution shall be beneficial
to the stockholders and not injurious to the public . . . the court
must make a final order dissolving the corporation .... "
In a recent case, In re Radom & Neidorif, Inc.,9 there was a
deadlock between stockholders as to election of directors. Special
Terni entertained an application for dissolution and appointed a
referee to hear and report. Before the hearing, the matter was
appealed to the Appellate Division which dismissed the applica-
tion. 0
By a four to three vote, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal, holding that for there to be a basis for dissolution, the
deadlock must not only prevent election of the Board of Directors,
but it must also impair the day to day functioning of the corpora-
tion and impair its economic well-being.
Radom & Neidorff was a family corporation owned equally by
a brother and sister who hated each other. The brother was the
sole officer of the corporation and completely managed its affairs
except that the sister had to co-sign all corporation checks. She
had refused for some time to sign his salary checks and had in-
stituted a derivative suit charging him with enriching himself at
the corporation's expense. However, the corporation had been
steadily piling up profits since the deadlock and was in good
financial shape.
Upon these facts, the court held that the dismissal of the peti-
tion was within the discretion of the Appellate Division. Follow-
ing Matter of Cantelmo,21 the court implied-that if the corpora,
lion's economic well-being is not impaired, it is not to the benefit of
the stockholders qua stockholders (and not qua individuals) to dis-
solve.
Fuld's dissent, in which Lewis and Froessel concurred, main-
tained that whether or not the stockholders would benefit should
19. 307 N.Y. 1. 119 N.E. 2d 563 (1954).
20. 282 App. Div. 854, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (1st Dep't 1953).
21. Matter of Canteimo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y. S. 2d 604 (1st Dep't 1953).
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be determined by the hearing, and not from the petition itself,
once there was the showing of a deadlock, as there was here.
Furthermore, the minority refused to expand the statutory lan-
guage of "deadlock" into "deadlock causing economic impair-
ment."
Also under Article 9, Special Term, in the case of In re
Seamerlin Operating Co.,12 entertained the application of the
owner of one half of the stock for dissolution of the corporation.
Instead of hearing the case itself, or referring it to a referee to
"determine" the facts under Section 113, Special Term referred
it to a referee to "hear the facts and make his report to the Court."
After lengthy hearings, the referee reported that "the dis-
solution would not be beneficial to the stockholders . . . and (pur-
suant to Section 117) the petition for dissolution should be denied."
Special Term however, upon application for a final order dis-
agreed with the referee's findings that dissolution would not be
beneficial to the stockholders and ordered dissolution.23
This order was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 4 but the
Court of Appeals reversed,2" Desmond, Fuld and Froessel dis-
senting. The court held that the statutory provisions were ex-
clusive-since Section 113 provided that the referee was to hear
and determine the facts, which determination would be binding
on the trial court, the court could not make a referral which would
not be binding by purporting to refer only to hear and report. The
trial court in its final order under Section 117, must follow the
findings of the referee, unless as a matter of law, they are unsub-
stantiated.
Desmond's dissent argues that even if the Legislature pro-
vided for the use of a referee to make binding determinations, that
would not preclude the use of a referee merely to report the facts
as in "all other special proceedings."
e. Power of stockholders to remove directors: Even though
the certificate of incorporation of a New York corporation pro-
vides that for cause shown and upon proper notice and hearilig,.a
director may be removed by the majority of the other directors in
office, and the certificate is silent as to the right of the stockholders
to remove directors, the stockholders do have the power to remove
directors at any time, for cause shown and upon proper notice
and hearing.
22. 131 N. Y. S. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
23. Id.
24. 130 N.Y. S. 2d 865 (1st Dep't 1954).
25. 307 N. Y. 407, 121 N. E. 2d 392 (1954).
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This recent decision of the court in Auer v. Dressel,2 resulted
from a refusal of a corporation president to call a special stock-
holders' meeting as prescribed in the by-laws, on the grounds that
none of the four purposes of the meeting was a proper one. The
crucial purpose was that the "stockholders should hear charges
preferred against four of the directors, determine whether their
conduct was inimical to the corporation, and if so, to vote for their
removal and vote for the election of their successors."
Without deciding.the question of whether adequate hearing
could be had before 1500 stockholders or their proxies, the court
held that such is a proper purpose for a stockholders' meeting.
Previous New York cases have held that stockholders cannot
remove directors without good cause,27 but that if cause is shown,
the stockholders have the inherent power even without specific
statutory authorization to remove directors.28 This appears to be
the first New York case to hold that the stockholders retain the
power although it is also given to the Board of Directors.
Van Voorhis' dissent, in which Conway concurs, argues that
the directors can be removed only after full and fair trial, either
under Section 60 of the General Corporation Law, or according
to the by-laws, by the remaining directors. If a meeting is called
for the stockholders to vote on removal, most stockholders would
be represented by proxy and could vote only by prejudging the
case. This would amount to the removal of directors by whim
and not for good cause as the law requires.
The court's answer to this is that the fairness of the pro-
ceedings is not now before it, and if any director is illegally re-
moved, he has remedy in the courts.
29
Fiduciary Duty of Employees
It is a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the employee to
the employer for the employees to act in any way inimical to the
interests of the employer to serve their own interests.30
In Duane Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke et al.,31 the Court of Ap-
peals illustrated this principle by affirming an award of damages
to an employer-advertising agency against former key employees.
While still employed by the plaintiffs, the defendants made
26. 306 N. Y. 427, 118 N. E. 2d 590 (1954).
27. People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911).
28. In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 321, 322, 178 N.E. 145, 146 (1931).
29. Ibid.
30. See Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935), Lamdin v. Broad-
way Surface Advertising Co., 272 N.E. 133, 5 N.E. 2d 66 (1936).
31. 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N. E. 2d 237 (1954).
